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RELIGION, SINCERITY,
AND FREE EXERCISE
PETER

J. RIGA*

Perhaps one of the most difficult conceptual tasks in constitutional
law is defining "religion" for purposes of first amendment freedoms. Once
that is done, a second formidable problem is that of juridical determination of sincerity in the individual claimant. The two tasks are both
clouded with constitutional difficulty.
This article will look at these two basic problems and try to bring
some added insight. It will be contended that the notion of religion is
much broader than has traditionally been realized; that the Supreme
Court's view and upholding in United States v.Seeger,' concerning religion and its centrality in the life of the believer gives us an accepted definition of religion for constitutional purposes; and finally, that the possibility, indeed the necessity, of showing sincerity of such belief is a normal
function of any court for one who claims such a religious right.
Throughout this article the terms "conscience" and "religion" are
used interchangeably since, as we shall see, religion represents a fundamental and existential choice of meaning by the believer concerning himself and the whole rest of reality. For constitutional purposes, this is
translated into conscience when the individual takes this meaning and
purpose and places it at the core of his existence such that it "requires
the believer to disregard elementary self-interest and to accept martyrdom, in preference to transgressing its tenets."2 This belief, in other
words, becomes unconditional and irrevocable in the face of any authority
other than his own conscience.
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RELIGION AND FREE EXERCISE

I
When discussing "religion" and the Free Exercise Clause, it has been
traditional in law to limit discussion to questions of laws that discriminate against religion or at least discriminate among the different modes of
belief such as between theism and nontheism.21- In other words, the first
amendment's injunction has been seen negatively (not favoring religion,
nondiscrimination of different forms of religion and no religion, etc.). In
point of fact, however, the courts have universally upheld almost all secular legislation against the free exercise of religion even if such legislation
had but a rational purpose. The burden on free exercise was hardly ever
considered, and since most statutes have a rational public purpose-as
health, safety, or morals, Free Exercise claims were subjected to minimal
court scrutiny.
Sherbert v. Verner3 was a radical departure from the traditional
stance of upholding nondiscriminatory secular law against almost any
Free Exercise claim because this case framed the problem in positive
terms. Sherbert viewed the problem of the burden of secular law on religion from the perspective of the claims of religion or conscience and how
secular law should least burden this exercise. Not only does the State
have to show a compelling interest in having its law obeyed, it would also
have to show that "it would plainly be incumbent upon the [state] to
demonstrate that no alternative forms of regulation would combat such
abuses without infringing First Amendment rights."4 In fact, Justice
Harlan was on target when he said, in dissent, that the State "is constitutionally compelled to carve out an exception-and to provide benewhose unavailability [for work] is due to their religious
fits-for those
5
convictions."
This positive dimension of conscience or of religious freedom is a revolutionary step forward in understanding the Free Exercise Clause. A
person is not only free to define his own religion and to be free of all
governmental compulsion in its exercise, but he is now capable of acting
constitutionally on those beliefs in a positive fashion in the face of nondiscriminatory secular legislation. These conscientious or religious actions
may be restrained by the State by showing, in addition to a very important State interest, that there is no reasonable alternative for the State to
accomplish its goal other than infringing the free exercise of religion. In
other words, whereas traditionally the burden was on the religious person
to show that his religious practice would not endanger the State's inter2. Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961).

374 U.S. 398 (1963).
' Id. at 407.
" Id. at 420.
3
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est, now the heavy burden of 1) showing this State interest, 2) of showing
that this interest is a heavy one, and 3) of showing that there is no reasonable alternative-is upon the State. The presumption of this first
amendment right is that both belief and its liturgical practice (understood in the broadest sense) are fundamentally protected and that it is
now the State which must show the contrary. It is a heavy burden for the
State to meet, and traditionally, compelling State interests have invariably been impossible to show. As a statement of law, we can no longer
accept the view of the Free Exercise Clause by Justice Frankfurter in his
famous dissent in West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette: 6
Law is concerned with external behavior and not with the inner life of man
... . Socrates lives in history partly because he gave his life for the conviclaw does not presuppose consent to
tion that duty of obedience to secular
7
its enactment or belief in its virtue.
This seems to be an incredible statement or misstatement of the relationship between conscience and secular law. Suffice it to say that historically,
it has been just the opposite. That is, to legally force people to do what
they consider an evil has been fiercely resisted in the West. The long list
of Jewish and Christian martyrs who accepted prison and death, rather
than obey a secular law which contradicted their faith, gives ample evidence of that.
In the late nineteenth century, in Reynolds v. United States,8 the
Supreme Court adopted the simplistic view that although religious beliefs
are protected by the first amendment, religious practices are not when
they conflict with the interests of the State. It is doubtful that the framers of the Constitution intended to protect only the freedom of cloistered
Benedictine monks. On the contrary, it seems that the view taken in
Reynolds, as well as that of Justice Frankfurter in Barnette, is erroneous
since there is abundant proof that religious activity is clearly protected by
the first amendment. Protection of belief only, without protection of the
outward manifestation of that belief, is a direct denial of freedom of religion. Sherbert has now closed this gap. It is now the State that must assume the burden of showing that it has an important interest and that
there is no alternative means of achieving its goal in each case.
This positive step forward for religious freedom was further advanced by the Supreme Court in United States v. Seeger.9 Although the
case gave no formal definition of religion, it had to grapple with the
meaning of religion in the life of a believer. Therein, a general definition
6 319 U.S. 624 (1943).

Id. at 655.
98 U.S. 145 (1878).
9 380 U.S. 163 (1965).
8
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of religion and belief was given, which "would [include] all sincere religious beliefs which are based upon a power or being, or upon a faith, to
which all else is subordinate or upon which all else is ultimately dependent."10 We shall see later in our study that this is a good objective definition of religion for both philosophical and legal purposes.1
In its own turn, this definition of religion in Seeger was turned into a
practical test which could be used by government officials for purposes of
determining what religion is and what position it held in the life of each
individual who makes a religious claim: "A sincere and meaningful belief
which occupies in the life of its possessor a place parallel to that filled by
the God of those admittedly qualifying for the exemption comes within
statutory

definition." 1 2

The

essence

of

this

definition

of

relig-

ion-whatever we call it-resides not in the nomenclature but in that "to
which all else is subordinate or upon which all else is ultimately dependent."18 Welsh v. United States14 further noted in this respect that "a
[draft] registrant's statement that his beliefs are nonreligious is a highly
unreliable guide for those charged with administering the exemption." 5
In other words, ultimacy is the criterion of religion in a constitutional sense as well as the place it occupies in the concrete life of this
individual. This determines religion in a constitutional sense. We shall
have occasion later to examine the sincerity of this belief. 6
In this way, no advantage is given to orthodox religious beliefs over
unconventional beliefs or to theistic forms of religion over nontheistic or
atheistic forms of religion. Religion equals ultimacy and commitment to
the ultimacy in the concrete life of the individual or the place that the
beliefs occupy in the life of that believer rather than in the content of
such belief. We shall later see that such a place of this belief in the life of
the believer will be borne out in his actions and life experience. Importantly it is not simply categorizing a belief as religious that occupies the
gravamen of Seeger (this is a sort of a condition precedent), but it is also
the place that such belief occupies in the life of the believer. If such a
belief is only speculative or intellectual, therefore, it will not suffice to
qualify under Seeger. The belief must existentially occupy a position of
uncompromising value in his life, which would "categorically [require] the
believer to disregard elementary self-interest and to accept martyrdom in
Id. at 176.
See pp. 258-262 infra.

12 380 U.S. at 176.
"

Id. at 174 (quoting WEBSTER'S
398 U.S. 333 (1970).
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Id. at 341.
See pp. 258-259 infra.
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preference to transgressing its tenets."17
This test can be used in all the cases cited under the Free Exercise
Clause, as, for example, opposition to war and blood transfusions, refusal
to work on sabbaths, the use of drugs in liturgy, etc. The definition of
religion is, of course, minimal and can be met in all forms of fundamental
faith. The faith, however, must be so existentially fundamental and absolute in the concrete life of the individual that it occupies a central position in his life and actions, since this belief is "based upon a power or
being or upon a faith, to which all else is subordinate or upon which all
else is ultimately dependent."' 8
Once again, it is not any belief that is accepted as "religious" by the
Court; for constitutional purposes, only those that concretely occupy a
central position in the actual life of a believer are accepted. Ultimate concern cannot be superseded by any other power on earth, and if the individual is commanded to do otherwise, he will be unable to do so and
would accept financial penalty, jail, and even death itself before he could
or would do so. The reason is simple; to disregard the ultimacy in his life
is to destroy himself at his very core, to destroy what he considers to be
the very meaning and significance of his life. An ultimate concern is an
act of the whole person to which he gives himself in an unconditional and
uncompromising way in his thought and daily actions. In this sense, the
Court's test in Seeger is both one of ultimate belief and of actions based
on that belief so that the positive nature of religious freedom insured in
Sherbert has come one more step toward concrete fulfillment. While Seeger sought to save the congressional statute concerning the qualification
for conscientious objector status which, on its face, preferred theism over
nontheism,' 9 it expanded both the notion of religion as well as its application to an infinite variety of beliefs, whether theistic, nontheistic or athe20
istic. The Court further clarified this point in Welsh v. United States,
where it held that secular belief should have equality with properly "religious" belief. Thus, the Court interpreted Seeger to require a traditional
conscientious objector to all war, that his "opposition to war stem from
the registrant's moral, ethical, or religious beliefs about what is right and
wrong and that these
beliefs be held with the strength of traditional reli'
gious conviction."'
It is therefore an error to claim that the Court "must develop a sort
of 'rudimentary natural theology' to determine which deviant religious
7 133 F.2d 703, 708 (2d Cir. 1943).
,s380 U.S. at 176.
Selective Service Act of 1948, 62 Stat. 604 (1948)(codified at 50 U.S.C. App. §§ 451-470

(1976)).
20 398 U.S. 333 (1970).
21

Id. at 340 (emphasis added).
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practices should be permitted to leaven national life and which should
not."22 After Sherbert, the presumption is that such practices do not and
that it is up to the State to show why the importance of the state interest
should override Free Exercise. Moreover, granting an exception or a less
restrictive alternative means would not save that interest. The reason is
fairness to the individual, since to force him to act contrary to his religion-conscience is, in reality, to destroy his personhood. Therefore, it only
seems appropriate to define religion and belief in a psychological and personal way.
The following two sections shall deal more concretely with this general notion of religion from a phenomenological point of view so that we
can better understand the Court's statement in Seeger. We must emphasize once again that this phenomenological approach-which the Court
itself used in Seeger since the majority therein relied on the views of several theologians, including Paul Tillich 23 -is valuable in showing the psychological, personal, and expansive notion of religion by the Court. There
remains the other existential half of the test: whether this faith truly is at
the heart of the life of this believer in a lived fashion. This comports with
notions of sincerity which we shall grapple with in the final section of this
paper. In other words, belief must be a final reality of some kind, to
which all else is subordinate or upon which all else is ultimately dependent. The key question for the Court would then be: What place does
this religious belief occupy in the life of this believer?
II
This phenomenology of religion starts from the premise that the
moral consciousness of man begins to appear at the same time he became
conscious of his own death. At one time, man was like the animals-not
conscious of himself as a being meant for death. Only when he became
conscious of his own mortality did he become a moral and responsible
being. This level of man's existence was as important as the appearance
of life itself because it marked a fundamental difference between man
and the rest of the living creatures. It was then that man began to discover the concepts of finality, meaning, and direction.
Thus, the "reason for" or the "why" of man and the universe remains
as it always has been, for the ancients and the moderns: the same leap of
faith into mystery which no amount of science or reason can either solve
or, given its methodology, even grapple with. Man today knows much
more than he did formerly-knowledge doubles today every 6 or 7
years-but man remains always in mystery when confronting himself and
22

Clark, Guidelines for the Free Exercise Clause, 83 HARV. L. REV. 327, 337 (1969).

" 380 U.S. at 187.
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the universe, regarding their origin and end. The final response to the
question of man and the universe must always be a response of faith.
This is as true for the "believer" as for the "unbeliever," and in this, they
both share the agony of choice concerning the ultimate meaning of the
human condition.
The opposition between faith as system and faith as belief is not as
radical as we might think. When we speak of faith, we spontaneously
think of religious faith or simply religion. To be religious and to have
faith have become synonymous. As such, there is but one kind of
faith-religious faith. In reality, faith has its first source within human
consciousness in search of some absolute. But before it is anything else,
faith is a human act by which each man and woman takes a position,
positively or negatively, on the question of the Absolute. Does human existence have meaning? What is this meaning for me?
The traditional notion of faith ends by taking as its point of departure that, in reality, is only its ultimate term. True faith is first and foremost a quest for the Absolute (or meaning) before being an acceptance of
anything. This is as true for traditional faith, theistic faith, or atheistic
faith. Only the eventual end of an interior journey can permit man to
form any notion of the Absolute. Faith cannot begin with faith in Allah or
Nirvannah or the Buddah or the Oneness of all that is our Jesus Christ;
nor can it begin with faith in the existence of God. This religious faith
already presupposes another faith, also fundamental: a faith by which
man gives himself to, and pronounces on, the meaning of his existence
and thus forms the notion of an absolute in his life. This forms the core
of his conscience of his existence, from which he judges the rest of reality
and for which he is ready to sacrifice everything, even his own life, rather
than contradict it. When this faith is present, it is at that moment that
we have religion in the basic sense of the word. Some call this absolute
"God"; others call the radical distinction here either a transcendent or a
secular faith, not faith itself. One need not be a theistic person to do this,
since every person does, and must do, it, consciously or unconsciously, in
his own life. We must speak about this faith.
When discussing faith, our point of departure must always be man.
One can, of course, believe in God; but if this faith is not initially a
human faith, it will have nothing to do with man. First, faith cannot be at
its inception a properly religious or "supernatural" endeavor; it must first
be, and be shown to be, related to the mystery of man himself. It should
be added immediately that faith is in a fundamental sense outside of or
beyond reason itself. But it is reason which, precisely because of its radical incapacity, starts man on a journey that is beyond man. This does not
mean that reason is "wounded," "unreliable," "distrusted" or "corrupt,"
but only that the reality toward which faith is orientated is simply of
another order than reason. This is why law must respect this dimension,
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within, however, the bounds of good order.
Man is not "faithful" (full of faith) because he is religious or has a
religion, but because he is endowed with reason open to the possibility of
the absolute, of meaning, and of significance. In this way, every man has
faith and must give a name to the essential mystery of human existence:
The Absolute. This faith is not always properly religious: often it is not.
Nor is it necessarily a faith in God; and if it is, it is so only in a secondary
sense and only as an interpretation of this primary faith which is more
basic. This human faith is the act by which each man gives his existence
a meaning. Before bringing us immediately to the existence or nonexistence of God, faith brings us first to human existence and its meaning.
Only then can we name this faith either as "transcendent" or as "secular"
or as "atheistic."
Certainly, faith is more than this, but it must at least be this before
it can be anything else. It is this human faith which must be termed
"faith in itself." This essential faith is the unconditional affirmation
given by each adult human being to the perceived value of his proper
reality. This human faith has no other intellectual content than this naked affirmation. It is this essential core of human personhood which the
first amendment protects and consequently gives rise to Free Exercise.
Essential faith does not necessarily proceed from intelligence or judgment; on the contrary, it precedes this human intelligence and judgment.
The first amendment protects the basic mystery of every human being.
Faith responds to the question of human existence and its meaning.
To exist as a human being is to have reason and to have faith in the sense
or the nonsense which it pronounces over his human existence. Faith is to
decide for oneself on the meaning and value of existence. One cannot,
therefore, oppose believers and non-believers. One can only oppose different beliefs. Faith may be transcendent or secular or atheistic but is
always, fundamentally and first of all, human faith.
Before being a properly religious phenomenon, faith is a human phenomenon and before it bears on God, faith bears on man in the measure
that man is a conundrum to himself and is self-questioning. If man is
self-questioning, it is because of his rational nature. All reflection on the
nature of faith, then, begins by a reflection on man and his reason. Faith
springs from a mystery which makes man and gives man his rational nature. Faith cannot bypass this reflection by man on himself, since it actually starts there. This inquiry must proceed to the point where rationality
ends in its own innate incapacity.
As paradoxical as it may appear, there is only one problem for man
from which all the others take their origin: the faculty from which he
expects the solution for all of his problems-his reason. Reason is at the
very root of natural faith, not because it "discovers" the Absolute or because it gives us insight, but precisely because of its impotence.
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The rationalism of the past has taught us to see in reason a primary
faculty, making knowledge a type of absolute. Rationalism has made us
forget a whole dark aspect of reason itself. Reason was, in the 18th and
19th centuries, the "irrefutable force" against every "mystery" and was
announced as the Kingdom of Light by Voltaire. Given enough
knowledge, all mysteries would disappear. Reason became the very measure of reality.
The truth, however, is that reason measures only the astounding obscurity of reality. If preceding centuries appear to have been sensitive to
the conquests of reason, the 20th century has been struck by its failures.
The contemporary philosophy of the absurd is the fruit and the testimony of the failure of reason to deliver on its promise of light.
That which makes reason an eminently paradoxical faculty, however,
is the fact that it is radically incapable of attaining that for which it
seems made-comprehension (i.e., a total understanding). In fact, human
reason is not only, nor principally, a faculty of knowledge (animals also
know, but they are not rational for all that); reason is above all a faculty
of comprehension which makes man properly rational and different from
other animals. Man is not content to know, he must also integrate his
knowledge into a whole-a comprehension (corn = together, prendere =
place) of reality in its totality. Man must comprehend what he has come
to know. To comprehend is to view with a total grasp, to operate a synthesis, to give a meaning and significance to the totality of knowledge,
and in this sense, comprehension goes beyond the totality of knowledge
itself. That is why every system of total view is a system of faith in the
sense or nonsense of his existence within the universe. This faith element
is part of every world view, whether we call it faith, conscience, religion,
or meaning. If human reason has in common with other animals a knowledge by which it registers a multiplicity of objects and sensation, it differs
from the animals by another major effort, that is, by a will to synthesize,
to comprehend, a "will to meaning." To comprehend is a first attempt to
find a basic unity which the world does not seem to have. Man is not
content to simply perceive, passively, the multiplicity of realities in the
world-the earth and sky, the sun and moon, the land and water-but he
also has a will to discover a link between them all, even if this link is only
chance. It is an effort to synthesize the apparent incoherence of the world
into a basic unity. Reason is therefore not content simply to know; it also
desires to comprehend. But its desire is always beyond its grasp.
This failure to which reason seems to be forever doomed is neither
the result nor the sign of any inherent weakness. Reason arises and lives
from that which apparently constitutes its proper failure. No matter how
far man pushes and develops his knowledge and the progress of science,
this world will always remain as problematic as ever for him, and it is not
because of the internal complexity of the world, but because of its objec-
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tivity, objectivity meaning the state of all that is not the knowing subject
and from which this subject distinguishes himself.
A hydrogen atom, for example, in spite of its apparent simplicity and
rudimentary structure, is not less a problem than a uranium atom. Nor is
the uranium atom less a problem than the greatest of the galaxies in the
universe. For however simple be apparent structures of an element and
however penetrating and precise be the analysis that science might give,
its problematic character remains integral and radical: Why does an atom
exist? Why is the universe, rather than not? What is matter and why is
it? There are the fundamental questions which knowledge cannot respond
to-only fundamental human faith can. It is not the lesser or greater
complexity of the world that renders any form of knowledge incomprehensible for reason but its objectivity. That is, the world simply has no
rhyme or reason why it exists, inherent in itself. That things are, rather
than not, is a mystery; even if reality is an illusion, the illusion exists and
calls for faith as explanation.
Knowledge is only the occasion for reflection. That is why the
ancients used to say that it was with wonder, with a consciousness of
noncomprehension, that reason takes its origin, and only then is philosophy born, not as another species of knowledge, but as a desire of total
comprehension, a desire which is as much alive today as ever before. This
is the definition of philosophy.
Reason is a discovery of problems rather than a solution to them. In
fact, reason is paradoxically at the source of man's problems since it
transforms the calm given by animal knowledge into a sort of "disquieting questioning," which opens man to a search without end. This is frustrating in the extreme. Reason reflects on knowledge, questions it, and
tries to make sense or meaning out of it in its totality. It is only when we
comprehend that we do not comprehend that man truly begins to reflect.
From this is born the desire to give perceived reality a total meaning
which can come only in faith.
One of the main signs of evolved civilization is anxiety; this is so because it continuously poses more questions than it has answers. Because
of our highly developed reflective and technical development we are much
more anxious than more primitive peoples. In fact, the progress of science
has only multiplied our anxiety, since the more man knows, the more he
sees that he does not know, and from all this, the less he is able to
comprehend.
For every solution to any problem there arises a thousand more questions not suspected before. From Descartes in 1650 to Einstein in 1955,
physics made enormous advances; yet, it is a fact that when Einstein
died, he faced infinitely more problems than did Descartes. Scientific research and its stupendous discoveries not only have not illuminated the
mystery of the world, but have simply put into sharper perspective its
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profundity and infinite complexity. The same is true for the long journey
of reason: the more it knows, the deeper it digs the abyss of its own ignorance and mystery.
Faith is already outlined for us in the human mystery of which reason is its first indicator. Faith is fundamentally related to this radical
incapacity of comprehension which we have seen to be inherent in reason itself. It is therefore not surprising that, in spite of the vastness of
modern technological and scientific knowledge, the revival of religion and
ideology as its secular counterpart has never been stronger. Theistic religion places this faith in "God"; secular humanism places its faith in reason; Marxist ideology places its faith in the coming classless society of
equality and justice; nontheistic religion places its faith in the oneness of
all reality of which man is only a fleeting consciousness. But all these
world views are characterized by the same animus: faith. This invincible
incapacity of total comprehension which marks reason is not a sort of
handicap or a diminution due to an unfortunate accident to be remedied
somewhere in the future. Rather, this incapacity comes from the fact that
reason cannot penetrate the core or essence of reality or of things; it cannot tell us about the "why" of totality.
Before every object, reason is invited to go beyond what it knows,
from the fact that nothing of what it knows satisfies reason. Reason questions itself and demands something beyond everything which it knows, to
a reality which escapes reason as the profound truth of the object whose
reality is known only in fragments. The grandeur and dignity of man
arises when he first suspects this question: something is hidden from us
which the consciousness of our ignorance reveals to us. It is the dark
night of reason which is called upon to go beyond itself, to faith which
every person must decide upon for himself. That is the reason why each
person is called upon to determine his own religion as a subjective endeavor above all endeavors. This is also why no court of law can inquire
as to the truth or falsity of such claims by the individual precisely because it is the individual alone who can do this by faith. And that is why
courts must defer to the individual who makes such a claim for himself.
All this permits us to perceive, not only the nonrational aspect of the
act of faith by which the Absolute is affirmed or denied, but also the nonrational character of this notion of the Absolute. The notion of the Absolute arises, in effect, when man has understood that perfect fullness (happiness) or total truth (meaning) are not to be found either in man himself
or in the world but in the going beyond their mutual opposition, in a
unity which would surpass this opposition. The Absolute is nothing more,
nothing else than this unity, no matter how it is expressed: theistically,
secularistically, or atheistically.
As we have already seen, however, reason splits reality since it can
think in no other way than subject-object, and it can conceive of reality
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or unity only as subject and object. Reason, therefore, cannot conceive of
the Abolute as it is; rather, it thinks of it as it is not. The Absolute is
neither a subject not an object as one more subject-object present in the
world. Adding itself to them, the Absolute would have to be distinguished
from and opposed to them. It would then never be the whole or the unity
of all; it would, in other words, no longer be Absolute. Far from being a
subject or an object in addition to the rest, the Absolute is a "going beyond" or the abolition of the distinction and opposition subject-object.
The Absolute is the relationship, impossible and impenetrable for reason,
which holds together subject-object. The Absolute is thus mystery, that
is, a reality radically inconceivable by reason, not because the Absolute
is a reality infinitely more complicated than all the rest, or too deep for
our intelligence, but because it is beyond the fundamental structure of
human intelligence and reason.
We are subjects because we can conceive of others and things as
"others," as objects in opposition to ourselves, distinct and at a distance
from ourselves. It is for this reason that the birth of reason-precisely
because of the nature of its workings-is also the death of the Absolute.
By conceiving in objectivity, reason places the Absolute at a distance
from itself and distinguishes itself from it. Reason separates itself from
the Absolute. Reason is, thus, atheistic, and the Absolute, which it conceives, is always a false absolute and is no longer the Absolute. It is,
therefore, not surprising that man questions himself about the meaning
of life. Rationally, the notion of'the Absolute is contradictory, impossible,
and absurd.
If, therefore, faith in the Absolute responds positively to the fundamental question of reason, it does not respond on the same plane as reason. If faith is a light, it is not a light for reason. From reason's point of
view, faith is and will always remain obscure. Reason believes, but it does
not know nor can it explain. For the believer, the world and existence
remain problems, and the questions which they pose remain as yet. Faith
does not dissipate the darkness any more than a flame banishes the night;
faith only permits us to direct ourselves through and pass by the night.
We must not expect that faith will do what it cannot do, that is, give us a
rational explanation of what is. Faith is not a "strengthened" continuation of reason; rather, faith is totally beyond reason. It is because much of
Western religious thought has seen in faith a sort of supernatural
strengthening of reason that so many problems have arisen when speaking of faith, precisely because faith has been presented as the explanation
of the world and as a perfect response to all of our problems. That is why
this notion of faith is so strongly criticized by logical and scientific reason
which has shown us the fragility of such a notion of faith.
If man one day desires to find a meaning to life, it shall have to be in
going beyond reason and the oppositions that reason requires for its
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proper functioning-by entering into faith. But man can do this only
painfully and with self-death; he must go beyond the subjectivity of the
"I" and the objectivity of the world; he must, in a sense, lie to himself
and to the world. The dawning of reason means the death and loss of the
Absolute; the rediscovery of the Absolute-or the restoration of unity and
meaning to man's life-passes by the death of rationality.
Conclusion
The birth of faith, whether human or transcendent, comes from the
radical incapacity of reason to comprehend reality. In this sense, both the
believer in God and the atheist and every shade in between share the
same human condition. They all must enter the dark night of incomprehension and make an act of faith in the significance and meaning of
human existence. No system, no person can escape from this leap into
darkness and all must make the same act of faith. It is this core of "religious" reality at the very heart of human existence (known as conscience
which seeks, establishes and lives by this meaning) which is protected by
the Free Exercise Clause of the Constitution. It is essentially subjective
and psychological, not a matter of essentially objective determination in
the sense of belonging to a church, sect, or group. This latter phenomenon is secondary to the primary right of the human person to seek this
ultimate meaning and the Absolute in his life.
III
SINCERITY

The second fundamental problem we encounter as we expand the notion of "religion" and consequently, the Free Exercise Clause is that of
the sincerity of religious belief actually held. We cannot say that given
this expanded notion of religion, that anyone can claim religious belief
from any law from which the courts would be excluded from investigating
because of the Ballard criterion. This would lead to anarchy and render
sovereignty by the government essentially meaningless.
What Ballard effectively did was to preclude investigation by courts
into the truth or falsity of what appears to the believer to be ultimate in
his life. The essence of the Free Exercise Clause frees man from such
inquiry by the State for the simple reason that the State is utterly incompetent to do so. But more positively, the Free Exercise Clause permits
each person, if he wishes, to find that ultimate meaning wherever he
wishes. This respect for the human person is at its maximum at this point
and that is why Ballard was on target, precluding courts or government
2' United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944).
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from "chilling" this right by any state investigation. The determination of
this "ultimacy" is exclusively in the hands of the human person in our
law.
But the basic problem as yet remains: is there no way for government
to discern real from spurious religious claims without investigating the
truth of the claims themselves? Under the very broad definition of religion which we have recited, how can a court gauge the sincerity of the
individual claims without placing a burden on the exercise of this religion? How can the court guard against the person who says that it is
against his religion to serve in the armed forces and that it is against his
religion to tell you why? If the court cannot define the content of religion
as such, since each man's religion represents ultimacy to him, then can
the courts somehow determine the sincerity of that belief so as to avoid
spurious claims?
The ultimacy of belief is what we have termed "religious." This may
be of an infinite variety from the traditional theistic view to that of political ideology of secular humanism. It should first be noted that courts
judge sincerity every day by extrinsic and intrinsic evidence of fact. A
person's actions usually speak louder than any of his words. The truly
religious objector to a nondiscriminatory secular law says the same thing
as the deceptor and therefore the one who really wants to cheat and
deceive will have no difficulty at this level. If he wants to escape the draft
and war badly enough, he can even join a traditionally pacifist church
(e.g., the Quakers). But one thing he cannot do is to consistently translate
that belief into his life's actions, because it is not his belief, and it is from
this perspective that the problem of sincerity must be examined.
Our first clue after Seeger is the existential role this belief has in the
life of this believer. In the words of the Kauten court:
Religious belief arises from a sense of the inadequacy of reason as a means
of relating the individual to his fellow-men and to his universe . . . . It is a
belief finding expression in a conscience which categorically requires the believer to disregard elementary self-interest and to accept martyrdom in
preference to transgressing its tenets.25
In other words, a true religious tenet, e.g., not to kill, not to pay taxes,
must occupy a central concern in the life of this individual such that no
human power, pressure, or blandishment will cause him to abandon such
a belief. It occupies the core of his person and he adhered to its truth in
such a way that to turn away from it would be to turn away from who he
is, i.e., his conscience. For government to compel such a betrayal is to pit
itself against what the first amendment attempted to safeguard and promote. This belief is not of an intellectual type of assent because it is exis2'5

United States v. Kauten, 133 F.2d 703, 708 (2d Cir. 1943).
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tential; the belief has become part of his being in such a way that it is the
core of his life. Such a person defines himself in the function of that belief. It includes what has been called the "inviolibility of conscience"-no
matter what the source (secular, religious, atheistic) of this belief for his
life. Since, in this sense, conscience and religion are interchangeable
terms, the question is at the very heart of the Free Exercise freedom.
Since ultimacy is itself unconditional, commitment to that faith must be
unconditional in the life of this individual. Here it is a question not of the
belief itself or its content but the total commitment of the individual to
that faith in his life.
Yet, the main problem of fraudulent claims still remains unresolved.
The courts seem to be caught on the horns of a dilemma: on the one
hand, grant all claims that are presented under the Free Exercise Clause
because it cannot investigate into the sincerity of these claims, which
would simply destroy legitimate governmental programs; or deny all
claims, thus infringing on Free Exercise rights of those who are in fact
sincere.
The task is considerably lightened when the adherents belong to a
sect whose theology and tenets are very well known by the courts (e.g.,
pacifist groups such as the Menonites). But certainly, first amendment
freedom cannot be restricted to groups who can readily show their historical adherence to these beliefs.
Courts are not helpless, however, in determining and separating
fraudulent claims, a task they do every day. First, since Free Exercise
claims are proper to the individual alone, it is fair and equitable to place
the burden of sincerity upon him and not upon the government. In other
words, in other constitutional claims, e.g., free speech, there are usually
objective standards established by the courts to determine the outer limits and permissibility of speech, as, for example, time, place, and manner
regulations. But this is patently impossible in the area of religion as we
have defined it above. The burden of sincerity rests on the claimant precisely because he is in the best position to prove his sincerity, and the
position of the State is impossible at this level.
Certainly the courts may accept extrinsic evidence on inconsistent
words and actions of the claimant by the government's own investigation,
and then it would be up to the claimant to explain them. For example,
when over ninety percent of the adult population of Hardenburgh, New
York became ministers of the Universal Life Church for purposes of tax
exemption on their property, the ruse was clear to the court which discounted the religion claim as a sham. Nothing in any of the claimants'
lives showed any commitment to this religion except joining a church to
escape tax levies, which gets us to the core of a demonstration of sincerity
by the claimant.
The proof of sincerity of religious belief does not, of course, reside in
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the objective truth of the tenets (this is beyond the competence of government to determine in any case) but in the concrete and existential
history and life of this individual who makes the religious claim in the
face of the State interest. In other words, the claimant must show that he
has in fact acted upon those beliefs in the past. His life must somehow
show the centrality of these beliefs or belief. This test, of course, is not a
perfect one since it may well be that the belief was never really articulated until the claimant was actually faced with a situation that necessitated an articulation of beliefs. Even here, though, there are usually some
indicia in life actions which will indicate a holding of a moral or philosophical or "religious" commitment which the claimant can point to. In
doubtful cases, like all questions of fact, it is the trier of fact who must
attempt to decipher the truth of this sincerity by the objective indicia
presented.
Of course, there also remains the possibility of a congressional test of
sincerity by prescribing alternative service where there is curtailment of
possible benefits or by prescribing volunteer work on days other than Saturdays (e.g., for Sabbatarians not working on Saturdays) or even by prescribing an added tariff for extra governmental services (e.g., paying added costs for home visitation for vaccination). All of these would show the
sincerity of the claimant while putting a fair burden on the exercise of
religion while not infringing upon it decisively.
These criteria and indicia are available to courts to enable them to be
selective about religious claims. In no way do they infringe on the exercise
of religion by either inquiring into the truth of the tenets themselves or
by placing an unfair direct burden on its exercise. The court is spared the
business of examining the faith of citizens while at the same time demanding that each claimant make out a reasonable case for his own
sincerity. For example, a North American Indian may show the liturgical
use of peyote and that he uses it only in such ceremonies. The traditional
liturgy of his "church" will raise a prima facie case for the sincerity of his
Free Exercise claim. On the other hand, the college student who claims
the same religious tenet will have to show his sincerity via an alternate
route since he belongs to no known church which uses it in its liturgy.
How central is this use to his beliefs? What evidence of the above listed
criteria can he bring forth to substantiate his sincerity, since the State
interest in forbidding this drug for health reasons is not only reasonable
but may even be compelling? (Once again, the State will have to show
that granting an exception will destroy the efficacy of the law where the
student successfully makes a religious claim.)
CONCLUSION

Sherbert and Seeger represent landmark decisions in the area of reli-
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gious freedom and the Free Exercise Clause. If adhered to, they shall
have represented the greatest step forward in this area in the past two
centuries of constitutional law. The balancing of governmental and individual interests is now done with a bias for freedom for the individual-which is the philosophical tradition of the Bill of Rights. This does
not leave the State helpless in the face of the infinite variety of possible
religious claims. It means only that the State bears the burden of showing
that where such a claim is made, its law can bear of no exception without
floundering.
Conversely, it is the individual claimant, in the face of a nondiscriminatory secular law, who must show his sincerity of belief by pointing to
the translation of this belief in his own life:
"For what is easier to
say: 'thy sins are forgiven thee'? or to say, 'take up
26
thy bed and walk'?
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Matthew 9:5.

